Abstract -We use disaggregated data on trade flows, production, and trade barriers for 41 countries in 1988 to examine the political and economic determinants of nontariff barriers, as well as the impact of protection (both tariff and nontariff ) on trade flows. We use an econometric framework that allows for the simultaneous determination of trade barriers and trade flows. Our results are consistent with political-economy theories of the determinants of protection: even after accounting for industry-and countryspecific factors, nations tend to protect industries that are weak, in decline, politically important, or threatened by import competition, but provide less protection to industries in which exports are important.
I. Introduction
T HEORETICAL interest has recently focused on the determinants of nations' trade barriers. Underlying these theories is the implicit belief that there are common economic and political factors that can explain the structure of protection across countries and industries.
In this paper we use disaggregated cross-country, crossindustry data for production, trade barriers, and trade flows of manufactured goods in 1988 to examine the political and economic determinants of global nontariff barriers (NTBs). As tariff levels have fallen and remained bound by General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) strictures, NTBs have increasingly become the instrument of choice for protection. The calls for protection from import-competing industries indicate that the pattern of trade is likely to have an effect on the structure of protection. Since protection (both tariff and nontariff) clearly affects trade flows, we use an econometric framework that allows for the simultaneous determination of trade barriers and trade flows. Unlike previous studies, our sample includes both developed countries with low barriers and developing countries with substantial protection across all manufacturing industries. A novelty of this paper is combining disaggregated data on production, trade flows, and trade barriers for a broad range of countries.
Our results are consistent with political-economy theories of the determination of trade protection. We find that NTBs are determined by more than just industry-or countryspecific factors. Nations tend to protect weak industries, as well as industries in decline, but provide less protection to export industries, perhaps out of fear of foreign retaliation. Large industries, which we think of as being politically important, also receive protection in the form of NTBs. We find that tariffs are used in conjunction with NTBs rather than as a substitute means of protection, and that NTB protection is endogenous in the sense that these barriers are in part determined by industry conditions such as import penetration. Finally, we find that trade barriers reduce imports, though our results are somewhat mixed as to the relative impact of tariffs versus NTBs.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section II discusses some previous work on the political economy of trade protection, as well as empirical studies of the effects of protection on trade flows. In section III we specify a model of trade barrier determination, along with a model of trade flows based on the monopolistic competition model of trade. Section IV describes the data, after which we present our empirical results in section V. Section VI concludes.
II. The Political Economy of Trade Protection
Given the economic consensus regarding the efficiency of free trade, models of trade barrier determination typically turn to political-economy explanations. 1 The key insight is that the structure of the political system can be important in the determination of trade protection when a distinction exists between consumers and producers, or between different groups of consumers or producers. The benefits of trade protection typically accrue to a narrow group of stakeholders in the protected industry, whereas the costs are spread over a much larger number of consumers, each of whom loses only a small amount. This asymmetry means that protection may be politically efficient even if it is inefficient in an economic sense. Baldwin (1982) discusses these political motivations for trade protection, whereas Magee et al. (1989) and Rodrik (1994) survey a variety of models in which political factors influence trade policy. Bhagwati (1982) also contains several interesting models of the determinants of protection. Grossman and Helpman (1994) provide a more rigorous theoretical foundation for this literature through an explicit model of the process by which different interest groups bid for protection. With perfect competition in the product market, their model predicts that the structure of protection depends on two factors: the elasticity of import demand, which indicates the degree to which trade barriers distort welfare, and the ratio of imports to domestic output, which reflects the political importance of the domestic industry. The surveys mentioned above discuss numerous other contributions to this literature.
There is by now a substantial body of empirical work on the political economy of trade protection. The papers by Marvel and Ray (1983 , 1987 , 1981a ,b, 1985 examine various aspects of the implication of the theoretical literature that the structure of protection across industries depends on the particular political and economic characteristics of each industry. Ray (1981b) estimates equations for the simultaneous determination of imports and trade barriers (both tariff and nontariff ) in the United States, and finds that NTBs in the United States fell mainly on capital-intensive, low-skill industries. Ray (1981a) estimates trade and protection equations for both the United States and an aggregate of foreign countries. While he finds that tariffs and NTBs were used as complements, he finds surprisingly little effect of trade protection on U.S. imports. More recently, Trefler (1993) estimates trade and NTB equations for the United States and shows that taking into account the simultaneous determination of imports and trade protection results in a substantially larger estimate of the effects of protection on imports. Trefler also finds that political factors and proxies for industrial structure, such as measures of union density and industry concentration, have the expected positive impact on the level of protection in the United States. Marvel and Ray (1983) estimate equations for the determination of U.S. tariffs and NTBs alone. They find that protection was given to politically important industries and industries under threat from imports, whereas healthy industries received less protection. They ascribe this to the Peltzman-Becker theory of regulation, which suggests that policy makers will seek to share an industry's good fortune with weaker sectors. Ray and Marvel (1985) estimate tariff and NTB equations alone for the United States, Canada, Japan, and the European Community (EC) as a whole. They find broad similarities in the structure of protection in these countries. Although tariff rates were generally low, they find that NTBs were used to undercut this apparent liberality, particularly in the EC. Dick (1994) also finds that NTBs were used to compensate industries affected by reduced tariffs, whereas Gawande (1995) finds that NTBs in the United States are largely used to retaliate against foreign protection. Caves (1976) and Helleiner (1977) provide econometric analysis of the determinants of Canadian tariffs, whereas Dean et al. (1994) provide a case-study analysis of recent trade liberalizations in a number of developing countries. Leamer (1990) provides evidence on the extent and effect of tariff and NTBs in Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries in 1983, focusing particularly on the effect of these barriers on Latin American countries. Harrigan (1993) examines the effect of protection on trade flows between OECD countries.
Like Ray (1981a,b) and Trefler (1993) , we combine the literatures on the determination of trade barriers and trade flows, and attempt to control for their simultaneous determination. One advantage of our analysis is that our sample includes both developed and developing countries, and thus encompasses substantially more variation in the structure of trade flows and trade barriers.
III. Models of Trade Barriers and Trade Flows

A. Determinants of Trade Barriers
As discussed in section II, the structure of production is probably best thought of as determined by both economic and political factors. To take into account the notion that the political power of the industry is likely to be important, we use two proxies for a sector's political influence: the size of the industry as measured by its share of value added within a country, as well as the industry's share of labor. Of course, these are likely to be imperfect indicators of political importance, since small industries may be seen as crucial to national security, or in many countries, might be directly or indirectly owned by policy makers.
There may also be political pressure to protect ''weak'' industries, such as those with low wages or productivity. To examine this, we include wage per worker and value added per worker in our model of trade barrier determination. Including both variables allows us to examine the extent to which protection is given to industries in which wages are high conditional on industry productivity-that is, do nations provide more protection to industries with labor rents? Of course, it may be impossible to make inferences about causality here, since protection could lead to a ''lazy'' industry with low productivity or high wages rather than a weak industry receiving protection.
To examine the tendency of declining industries to receive protection, we include the five-year change in the log wage per worker (from 1982 to 1987) as an explanatory variable. If there is profit sharing in an industry, declining wages would indicate declining rents, and thus shifting comparative advantage. We would also expect political pressure for protection to be stronger in industries ''threatened'' by import competition. Counterbalancing this, however, might be a desire to avoid retaliation by other nations aimed at domestic export industries. To examine these possibilities, we include as explanatory variables both a measure of import penetration (the share of imports in domestic use) as well as a measure of the importance of industry exports (the share of exports in the output of each industry).
Not surprisingly, there are other determinants of trade protection for which we could not obtain data. For example, Grossman and Helpman (1994) show that trade barriers are more likely to exist the lower the own price elasticity of demand for an industry's product, since this entails a smaller deadweight loss to consumers. Similarly, the higher the foreign price elasticity of supply, the more effective will be a given trade barrier in changing the pattern of trade. Since we could not obtain cross-country, cross-industry data on elasticities and industry characteristics such as concentration ratios, we must instead rely on the inclusion of industry fixed effects to account for any omitted industry-specific effects. This will work to the extent that these omitted factors are constant across countries. We also present specifications that include country fixed effects. These will account for differ-373 TRADE BARRIERS AND TRADE FLOWS ences in the overall trade regime, which are specific to particular nations.
We take tariff rates as exogenous determinants of NTBs. While not strictly correct, this is probably not too bad an assumption relative to NTBs, since tariff rates in many countries are under GATT strictures. For the United States, Ray (1981b) finds no feedback from NTBs to tariffs. In our basic specification, then, NTBs in industry i of country j are expected to respond to sectoral imports and other economic and political factors, As discussed above, wages and labor productivity proxy for each sector's competitive position, while the sectoral share of value added (or, alternatively, the sectoral share of labor L ij /L j ) is meant as a proxy of political power. The change of real wages captures the evolution of each industry. Since declining industries typically call for protection, we would expect this to be associated negatively with NTBs. Tariff rates and the black-market premium are included in the regression to examine whether different varieties of trade restrictions tend to be used as substitutes or in tandem.
We specify equation (1) using a logarithmic functional form. As detailed in the next section, our measure of NTBs is a coverage ratio which is bounded from below at zero. To take this censoring into account, we specify the NTB equation as a tobit,
otherwise.
B. Monopolistic Competition Model of Trade
For the determination of trade flows, we use a simple monopolistic competition model of trade based on Helpman and Krugman (1985) . With identical homothetic preferences for consumers, each country consumes identical proportions of each product. Goods are assumed to be imperfectly substitutable and differentiated by country of origin. Since the production of each variety of a product occurs in only one country, the model gives a prediction of the volume of trade as follows:
where IM ij 5 import of good i by country j Q ij 5 production of good i in country j Q i 5 total world production of good i s j 5 share of country j in world income.
Equation (3) states that country j's import of good i is proportional to the amount of good i produced outside country j. One prediction from equation (3) is that the import share of a good in a particular country is inversely related to that country's share of production of world output of that good,
Domestic use DU ij equals production plus imports minus exports. Equation (4) provides a basic framework with which to estimate the volume and composition of trade. 2 The monopolistic competition model gives a prediction of the volume of trade in the absence of trade barriers. When the Helpman-Krugman model is extended to include trade policies, as in Flam and Helpman (1987) , it gives ambiguous predictions about the effects of protection on welfare, production, and trade flows. In the simple framework above, however, the model unambiguously predicts that the presence of trade barriers, such as tariffs, NTBs, and exchange controls, will diminish the volume of trade.
We augment equation (4) to include measures of trade barriers and transport costs, and we adopt a logarithmic functional form,
2 Some examples include Helpman (1984) , Lawrence (1987) , Bergstrand (1989), and Harrigan (1993) .
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The variables tariff and NTB measure the intensity of trade barriers on good i in country j, while the black-market premium BMP is meant to capture the distortionary effects of exchange controls that might hinder imports. These are described in section IV. A trade-weighted measure of distance between the capital of each country and the capitals of its trading partners is used to proxy for transportation costs, as in Bergstrand (1985 Bergstrand ( , 1989 . Our specification for trade flows is similar to that of Harrigan (1993) , who estimates the effects of tariff and NTBs (which are taken as exogenous) on bilateral trade flows in manufactures in OECD countries. As with the NTB equation (2), we estimate specifications with industry fixed effects, as well as with both industry and country fixed effects. As pointed out by Leamer and Bowen (1981) and Leamer (1988) , the response of imports to tariffs and NTBs is likely to vary substantially across industries, since this depends on elasticities of supply and demand, which might differ widely across industries. In contrast, there is likely to be less variation in these elasticities within a given industry across countries, so that estimating cross-country regressions separately for each industry is preferable to pooling across industries. Unfortunately, as we discuss in the next section, we have data on trade barriers for only one year, and our data are further limited to each nation's total trade flows in each industry, so that we must pool across both countries and industries to obtain sufficient degrees of freedom for estimation. The results for coefficients a 3 and a 4 in equation (5) should thus be interpreted as average values of the effects of tariffs and NTBs on imports.
Since the production of each good is determined simultaneously with trade flows, we follow Harrigan (1995) and use factor endowments to instrument for sectoral production. We use the economywide factor endowments of each nation's capital stock, labor force, human capital, and land area. These are also described in section IV. Unfortunately data on sector-specific inputs are not available for our wide range of countries. An immediate implication of this is that we cannot compare our results with those from a Heckscher-Ohlin model like the one Harkness (1978) estimates for the United States, in which factor endowments determine the pattern of trade.
The production share and the distance measure are used as instruments for imports and thus do not appear in the NTB equation, whereas the ''political-economy'' variables instrument for the level of protection, and do not enter into the import volume equation. This latter identifying restriction is clearly more troubling, since trade flows might have a direct effect on productivity, the industry share of value added (or workers), and the evolution of wages.
We assume that the error terms u I and u N are distributed with a bivariate normal, and estimate equations (2) and (5) jointly using the simultaneous-equations tobit methodology of Nelson and Olson (1978) . We also estimate the equations using the corresponding single-equation methodologies (tobit and ordinary least squares), and calculate a Hausman test of the null hypothesis of no simultaneity bias.
IV. Data
A. Trade and Protection Data
To measure the degree of trade barriers across industry and country, we use the data set of trade control measures (TCMs) compiled by UNCTAD (1991) . This provides information on both tariffs and additional charges on imports in 1988, as well as information on the coverage of nontariff measures (NTMs) at the most detailed level of the Customs Cooperation Council Nomenclature (CCCN)-four digits plus up to two alphabetic codes.
The tariff provided by UNCTAD is the ad valorem nominal rate for total import charges; this includes all duties and customs fees collected at national borders. The measure of NTBs reports the coverage ratio for ''core'' NTMs; this includes essentially all nontariff restrictions applied at the border, including quantitative restrictions (QRs), voluntary export restraints (VERs), and advance payment requirements. Note, however, that the measures of both tariffs and NTBs do not include restrictions which apply inside national borders, such as consumption taxes in countries with no domestic production. See UNCTAD (1987 UNCTAD ( , 1991 and Laird and Yeats (1990) for details.
The coverage ratio indicates the extent to which the tariff lines within a CCCN category are affected by core NTMs. For instance, the index equals zero for a particular four-or five-digit CCCN category if no NTMs apply to any of the products that make up that category. The CCCN category for autos might include tariff lines for both small and mediumsized products. If a country has an NTM on small but not medium-sized cars, then the coverage ratio for that CCCN category would equal 0.5, regardless of the composition of auto imports. The NTM coverage ratio thus captures only the frequency of the nontariff restrictions, but provides no information on the severity of the distortions or the distribution of the resulting quota rents.
The data set also provides the value of trade flows taken from the United Nations COMTRADE database. The trade flow data are at the level of disaggregation needed to match the tariff and NTM data (either four or five digits of SITC revision 2), so that the UNCTAD database facilitates combining the trade barrier data with import values.
Unfortunately, reliable cross-country, cross-industry production data are available only at the three-digit level of the ISIC classification, so we must aggregate up the data on trade barriers and trade flows by weighting them by the country's import value. Weighting by the own import values has the well-known problem that a high level of protection typically results in a low level of imports, and thus a low weight. As a check on this bias, table 1 reports tariffs and NTBs aggregated from the three-digit level to a single value for each country (what might be thought of as the ''zero-375 TRADE BARRIERS AND TRADE FLOWS digit'' level), using both import and production weights. Just as import weights will understate trade barriers, production weights will overstate them, since a high trade barrier will result in larger domestic production than would occur in the absence of all barriers. At this ''zero-digit'' level, the simple correlation between the two weighting schemes is 0.982 for tariffs and 0.971 for NTBs, whereas the rank correlations are 0.966 for tariffs and 0.945 for NTBs. These high values provide some hope that using import weights to go from four or five digits to three digits will not introduce too much bias into the measures of trade protection.
B. Production, Labor, and Wage Data
Data on gross output and value added as well as industry wages and employment at the three-digit level of the ISIC classification system are from the United Nations Industrial Statistics Yearbook, volume 1, as found in the BESD database of the World Bank. The data on wages include wages, salaries, and supplements. These wage data, along with the data for gross output and value added are in home-country currency. To match the trade flow data, which are reported in U.S. dollars, we convert the currencies using the exchange rate series from the Summers and Heston (1991) data set. Implicit gross domestic product (GDP) deflators from the Summers and Heston data set are used to deflate lagged wages in order to obtain the change in wage per worker in 1988 dollars.
The data for the black-market premium, distance, and the factor endowments of land, area, human capital, and labor force are from Barro and Lee (1993) . The measure of distance is the import-weighted distance between a nation's capital and the capitals of its trading partners. The blackmarket premium on foreign exchange is measured as an average of the period from 1980 to 1984. Table 1 gives a summary of protection by country, whereas table 2 summarizes protection across industries. Our sample is limited by the availability of both the trade data and the production data. For example, the UNCTAD trade barrier database does not include non-EU developed countries such as Austria, Switzerland, Australia, and New Zealand. Similarly, reliable production data are not available for many countries, particularly developing countries.
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C. Features of Trade Barriers
Construction of the import-and production-weighted tariffs and NTBs are discussed above; the standard deviations shown in tables 1 and 2 are of the unweighted tariff rates and NTM coverage ratios. As expected, importweighting typically results in smaller measures of protection than production weighting although, again, the two are highly correlated.
Even a brief glance at table 1 reveals the dramatically higher levels of protection in developing countries than in developed. (The table is sorted by 1988 per-capita real GDP from the Summers and Heston data set.) Indeed, numbering the countries with 1 being the richest (United States) and 41 the poorest (Kenya), we find rank correlation coefficients of 0.464 between the income ordering (1-41) and importweighted NTBs, and 0.793 between the income rank and import-weighted tariffs. On the other hand, while tariff rates are quite low in most developed countries, these nations employ a notably higher level of NTB protection (relative to their tariff levels)-there is a rank correlation of 20.289 between the income rank and the ratio of NTBs to tariffs. This is consistent with the findings of Marvel and Ray (1983) and Dick (1994) that NTBs were used to offset the diminished tariffs negotiated in the various GATT rounds. The higher tariff levels in developing countries probably also reflect the greater importance of these relatively easily collected revenues in government finance. Table 2 shows that protection, particularly NTBs, is concentrated in certain industries, notably food, clothing, steel, and transport equipment. NTB protection similarly appears to be given to large industries-the rank correlation is 0.45 between import-weighted NTBs and the industry share of world output. In contrast, the analogous rank correlation for tariffs is only 0.07.
Of course, the makeup of the above list of industries covered by NTBs is for the most part explained by industryspecific managed trade arrangements, such as the MultiFibre Arrangement for textiles and clothing, and the web of bilateral quantitative restraints that govern trade in steel and automobiles. This suggests that the pattern of protection Hufbauer and Rosen (1986) ascribe to the United States might apply to the rest of the world as well-that protection is ''special'' in that it is industry specific. If this were the case, then including industry fixed effects in the basic regression specification of equation (5) would eliminate the statistical significance of political-economic determinants, such as the political importance or competitive position of an industry in each particular country. We should note that outlying observations in tables 1 and 2 are the effect of particularly large protection by specific countries in certain industries. For example, despite otherwise moderate barriers, Venezuela protected its furniture industry in 1988 with an 85% tariff and 93% NTB coverage, accounting for the large standard deviations of Venezuela's protection found in table 1. Similarly, Sweden had zero or near-zero NTB coverage for most industries, but substantial protection (coverage ratios over 50%) in food, textiles, clothing, and footwear. Finally, the United Nations concordance we use to go from the detailed CCCN classification to the three-digit ISIC classification assigns no products to ISIC category 356, plastic products, but instead places these in various other categories.
V. Empirical Results
Equations (2) and (5) are estimated jointly using a simultaneous-equations tobit estimator, where the import equation (5) is the usual linear model, and the NTB equation (2) is censored at zero. The results are found in tables 3 and 4. As discussed above, all exogenous variables are used as instruments, with the political-economy variables excluded from the import equation, and the production share and distance measure excluded from the NTB equation. Also as noted before, factor endowments are used to instrument for the production share; the R 2 for these first-stage regressions is over 0.8 for all specifications.
In order to examine the degree to which industry-and country-specific factors determine protection, we estimate the models first with industry fixed effects, and then with both industry and country fixed effects. As a prelude to joint estimation of the simultaneous system, we briefly discuss the results of an analysis of variance (ANOVA) model for the two equations, in which we examine the extent to which industry and country fixed effects alone account for the variance of NTBs and imports. 3 For the NTB equation, the model with the two sets of fixed effects has an R 2 of 0.675, with the country effects alone accounting for 0.571. This suggests that a large part of the structure of NTBs can be best explained by simply looking at the average level of protection in each country, much as listed in table 1. In the import equation, on the other hand, the R 2 of the model with both country and industry effects is 0.566, with the industry effects accounting for 0.293, or just over half of the variance. Table 3 contains the results for estimation of the NTB equation (2). Columns 1 to 3 include only industry effects, whereas columns 4 to 6 include both industry and country fixed effects. Even with the inclusion of both sets of fixed effects, the results are in general well reconciled with political-economy theories of protection. As shown in the table, we present the variables in the following loose groupings: demand for protection, comparative advantage, political importance, and other trade influences. We discuss each group in turn.
A. Determinants of Nontariff Barriers
The coefficient on the share of imports is significant and positive in all specifications except column 5, showing that industries ''threatened'' by import competition tend to receive more protection. The coefficient is even larger in magnitude in column 5 (which includes country effects and uses the labor share as the proxy for an industry's political importance), though it is far less precisely estimated.
The negative coefficients on the change in wage per worker indicate that declining industries receive more protection. Note, however, that this result is not robust across specifications: the coefficients are not statistically significant in the specifications which include country effects (columns 4-6), with the least significant result in column 5, where the share of workers replaces the share of value added. The coefficient on the share of industry output that is exported is negative in all specifications and statistically significant except in column 5. This accords with the idea that nations refrain from protecting industries for which exports are important out of fear that their trading partners will retaliate for any import restraints.
In columns 1 and 2, which include only industry fixed effects, the coefficient on wages is negative and significant, whereas the coefficient on labor productivity is positive and significant. This indicates that nations give less protection to industries with labor rents-industries in which wages are high after controlling for productivity. The significant negative coefficient on wages alone in column 3 similarly indicates that nations tend to provide more protection to low-wage (''weak'') industries. We obtain a similar result (though somewhat less significant) if productivity alone is used instead of wages. The negative coefficient on wages somewhat allays our fears regarding the endogeneity of our right-hand-side variables, since we would usually expect wages to rise if they were affected by trade barriers. Note, however, that these results do not remain when we add country fixed effects in columns 4-6: in all three specifications, the coefficients become not significantly different from zero.
The coefficient on the industry share of value added is positive and significant in all specifications, indicating that large industries, which we interpret as politically important, also tend to receive more protection. In columns 2 and 5 we use the industry share of labor as the measure of political importance-this might better reflect the actual number of voters and thus the raw political importance of the sector rather than the economic importance indicated by the share of value added. The coefficient on the share of workers is positive and significant with just industry effects in column 2; but as with the import share above, when we add country effects, the coefficient on labor share becomes much larger in magnitude, but not statistically significant. Overall, 3 Note that the ANOVA is a linear model and thus does not take into consideration the censoring of the NTM.
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The positive and significant coefficients on tariffs and the black-market premium indicate that other trade measures and exchange rate controls are used in conjunction with NTBs; this matches the findings of Marvel and Ray. Note that we omit the black-market premium in columns 4-6, since this does not vary across industries within a country.
The bottom of table 3 provides the coefficient on imports from the corresponding single-equation Tobit estimates of equation (2), along with Hausman tests of the null hypothesis of no simultaneity bias for the NTB equation. We cannot reject this null at the 5% significance level for any of the six specifications-the p-values range from 0.40 to 0.35 with industry effects, and are uniformly one with both country and industry effects. On the other hand, comparing the two estimates of the coefficient on imports provides some evidence that the simultaneity of trade barriers and trade flows matters for the determinants of trade barriers. In the single-equation estimates, where the effect of NTBs on imports is neglected, we find either an insignificant or a negative effect of imports on NTBs; this no doubt reflects the usual import-reducing effects of NTBs. But this is strongly reversed in the simultaneous-equations estimates, in which we find a positive effect of import penetration on NTBs. In other words, our results indicate that it is not simply that industries with high import penetration receive protection, but rather that industries receive more protection to the extent that they have high import penetration after taking into account the level of NTBs. Table 4 contains estimates of the specifications of the import equation (5); the columns correspond to those in table 3. As in the NTB equation, we drop distance and the black-market premium from columns 4-6, since these do not vary within each country.
B. Determinants of Manufactured Imports
The negative and highly significant coefficient on the output share in all specifications indicates that the monopo- 
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listic competition model seems to work well. Interestingly, estimation of the equivalent specifications without any fixed effects (results not shown) results in a substantially worse fit-the R 2 values are always less than 0.2. Adding industry fixed effects substantially improves the fit of the equation over the no-fixed-effects case. As shown in table 4, the adjusted R 2 values are about 0.5 with industry effects and just over 0.6 with both industry and country effects. The sizable contribution of the industry effects in explaining the import share matches the results of the ANOVA discussed above, and most likely indicates that the products of certain industries are simply more frequently traded than others, or that global trade in certain industries is comprised to a large degree of two-way shipments of differentiated products of the type best characterized by the monopolistic competition model. As expected, the coefficient on distance is always significant and negative; the coefficient on the black-market premium is similarly negative, but not statistically significant.
The specifications of the import equation in table 4 provide mixed evidence on the extent to which tariffs and NTBs reduce imports. When only industry fixed effects are included, NTBs have a strong negative effect on imports, and appear to be more substantial barriers to imports than tariffs, which have a statistically insignificant effect on imports. When country effects are added, however, the coefficients on tariffs and NTBs change in both sign and significance. In the specifications which use the industry share of value added (columns 4 and 6), the coefficient on tariffs becomes negative and significant, whereas that on NTBs is positive but not significant. When the labor share is used in column 5, however, the situation is nearly the opposite, with NTBs having a nearly significant effect on imports but tariffs almost no effect at all. In results not shown, we find that including both the labor share and the share of value added gives negative but insignificant coefficients on both NTBs and tariffs. Overall, our results seem to indicate that trade barriers in general hinder imports, but provide no conclusive evidence as to the relative impact of tariffs versus NTBs.
In contrast to our somewhat mixed results, Harrigan finds that ''tariffs . . . were a more substantial barrier to trade in manufactures between developed countries than were nontariff barriers.'' Of course, our specification is substantially different, not only in the number of countries, but also in that Harrigan estimates industry-specific regressions using bilateral trade flows, whereas we have data only on the total imports and exports of each country. As mentioned before, because we pool across industries, our results in table 4 should be interpreted as average values of the effects of trade barriers on imports across countries and industries. Evaluating at the average values of our data, the coefficients in columns 1-3 imply that if the global coverage of NTBs across industries decreases by 10%, then the import share will rise by between 7.4% and 8.9%, whereas the results in column 5 imply an increase of 5.2% in the import share. These results are quite close to the figure of around 5.0% that Trefler (1993) obtains for the United States.
The Hausman tests at the bottom of table 4 show that we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no simultaneity bias in the import equation when we include only industry effects, but strongly reject the null in the specifications with both 
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industry and country effects. Even though we cannot reject the null of no simultaneity in the specifications with only industry effects, allowing for the simultaneity of NTBs and imports in these specifications results in estimates of the effect of NTBs on imports which are two to three times larger in absolute value than the single-equation estimates which ignore this simultaneity. In the specifications with both industry and country fixed effects, the Hausman tests provide statistical evidence that this simultaneity is important, though our inconclusive results for the effect of NTBs on imports preclude a straightforward interpretation of differences in this coefficient between single-equation and simultaneous-equations estimates.
VI. Conclusion
Our results indicate that protection is not specific to particular countries and industries, but instead that the structure of NTBs across countries and industries can be explained by sectoral conditions. This is consistent with political-economy explanations of trade protection. Of course, we have not tested a specific model of protection, but rather examined some of its general determinants.
Also, we have data for only a single cross section of data on tariffs and NTBs, and are thus not able to look at the effects of changes in protection over time. This is clearly a concern for our identifying restrictions, which use industry conditions such as labor productivity and wages per worker to instrument for the level of NTBs. If protective measures are long standing, the causality might be the reverse; that is, the existence of barriers could influence industry conditions, rather than policy makers responding to industry-specific calls for protection. However, the significant negative coefficients we find on wages per worker and changes in wages per worker somewhat mitigate this concern, since we would expect wages to rise rather than fall in response to protection.
Further work is needed to examine the impact of variables such as demand and supply elasticities, which figure prominently in the theoretical literature but for which we were unable to obtain data. Also, our measures of an industry's political importance-industry shares of labor and value added-are probably far from ideal. For some countries, unionization data might be an important measure, whereas for others, the extent of ownership by the ruling party or family would no doubt be closely tied to the structure of trade protection. And as mentioned before, bilateral data on trade barriers and trade flows would allow for industry-byindustry estimation, whereas disaggregated data on factor endowments would allow us to compare the results of a Heckscher-Ohlin model with those from our monopolistic competition model of trade.
The limitations imposed by data availability notwithstanding, we obtain remarkably robust results that sectoral factors are important determinants of the structure of trade protection, even after taking into account industry-and countryspecific fixed effects. Our results thus provide encouraging support for the burgeoning literature on the political economy of trade protection.
